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CLIFTON HILDEBRAND et ai., Petitioners, v. THE STATB .
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
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[IJ Atto111e,s-Grounds for DlsclpliDarr Action-Solicitation
Employment.-Rule 2(a) of Rules of Professional Conduct,·
forbidding solieitillg of employment, is violated by ·attOrn.~,
who agree IlDder Ii plan with a uniop to render its memben°'
service at a reduced rate in \;ontempIatioD of a I.t.rge vol
' ..
of business resultiDg hom the union's recommendatioL of &heir
employment.
.
[2&. 2b J Id. - Grounds for .allsciPlinarJ Action - Solicitation .,.
Employment.-Attorneys violate rule 3 of Rules of Prof...
siODal Conduct, proscribing remuneration of another by
attorney for soliciting or obtaining professiona:I employmea\'
for him aDd denounciDg an atto111ey's knowiDg acceptance Of.'
!mpioyment as a re!Jillt of activities of an organization which
influences such employment, althougb tJley operate under •.
plan with a union providing for payment by the client undal: :.
separate contracts of separate fees to the union and attorn.,.., ::
where the union i!ncourages their employment by its meaibeil,·.
and tbe two contracts constitute but one overa:Il transaction. ,.
[3] 14. - Grounds for DisciPlinarJ Action - Solicitation of BIDployment.-It is Dot essentia:I to violation of ule 3 of Rulee .
of Professional Conduct that the remuneration by an atto111ey -'
of another for soliciting of employment be in mODey, but jn.'~

an.· .

[1] See 9 Oal.Jur. lO-Yr. Supp. (1949 Rcv.) 485; 6 Am.Jur. 416. .
• cX. D1&. Reference: i.l-4J At.torneys, i laG.
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eludes the advantages accruing to Ii union under a plan which
assures that its members' litigation will be handled by experi.
enced attorneys at a reduced rate, and which eonstitute~ an
inducing ~use for attracting union membership and payment
of dues.
[4] Id.-Grounds for Disciplinary Action-Solicitation of Employment.-Although, prior to a disciplinary proceeqing, attorneys
have ceased operating under a plan with a union calling for
a client's payment of separate fees to the union and to themselves, and have substituted an arrangellJent whereby the client
pays only a single fee to the attorneys who pay the union'.
investigators on :l. quantum meruit hasis, such substitution will
Dot release them from uccountability for their prior conduct,
particularly where the union's channeling of employment to
them continues.

PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of disciplinary
action against three attorneys. Proceeding dismissed.
Clifton Hildebrand, in pro. per., and Sheridan Downey,
Jr., for Petitioners.
Eugene D. Williams and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent.

,

THE COURT. - Petitioners are attorneys, Hildebrand
having been admitted to practice in 1925, Bills in 1923.1 and
McLeod in 1935. By this proceeding they seek a review of
the recolnmendation of the Board of Governors of The State
Bar that they be disciplined for the violation of rule 2,
section a (commonly known as the "solicitation to rule) and
rule 3 (generally referred to as the "ambulance chasing"
rule) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of The State Bar
of California. (26 Cal.2d 32.) The disciplinary action arose
out of petitioners' representation of injured railroad men on
claims against railroad companies, pursuant to a contract with
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen designating them as
regional counsel for the Brotherhood-Hildebrand having
acted alone in such capacity beginning in 1933, then joined
by Bills sometime prior to 1940, and by McLeod in 1942.
By the notice to show cause petitioners were charged with
41 separate acts of solicitation of professional employment;
a general "conspiracy" for the purpose of soliciting and
obtaining employment as attorneys, including the employ.
ment of others to procure such employmrnt for them, with
"runners and cappers" actillg for thew ill violation of section
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182 of the Penal Code. and "dividing ... attorneys'
with persons not attorneys," and "knowingly accepting .
professional employment" offered to them as an incident
the activities of such persons; and specific instances of
pf'nsation of certain named persons not licensed to practice
law for their solicitation of employment on behalf of
titioners.
Petitionf'rs filed a written answer in denial of an the 1!1l'~"''''''''_
and in addition urged as affirmative defenses: (1)
procef'dillg was "brought to serve private purposes and n ..;i~.. ·t..-·-":1
spites" of the railroad companies (Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal.
47 [17 P.2d 112) ; Burke v State Bar, 218 Cal. 143 [21 P.2d·
577) ; Herrscker v. State Bar, 4 Cal.2d 399 [49 P.2d 832]);
and (2) that petitioners' methods of practice and activities
had been approved by decisions from this and other jurisdictions. (Hildebrand v. State Bar, 18 Ca1.2d 816 [117 P.2d
860) ; Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 268 Ill.App. 364; In ,.6 .)
Seidman. 228 App.Div. 515 [240 N.Y.S. 592].)
.1'
Nu~erous hea.rings were held before the local administrat.ive. ..•.
commIttee runmng from May througb August, 1948. durIng .
the course of which an amendment was made to the notice .
to show cause whereby (1) the "conspiracy" count--w88,
expanded to include specific reference to petitioners' accept-j
ance of "professiona] employment" as "incident to the .ac:.-.j
tivities . . . of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,an
association that for compensation. controlled,· directed. and
influenced such employment"; and (2) a new count was.
added describing the legal aid services rendered by the
Brotherhood to its injured members and petitioners' connection therewith. Following petitioners' denial of these later
added charges at the subsequent hearings, and argument and
submission of the matter, the committee on December 1, 1948,
made findings and conclusions adverse to petitioners. In this
regard it will suffice to say that the committee sustained the
charges of petitioners' soHcitation of professional employment in more than 20 separate cases; petitioners' compensation of some six persons acting as "runners" or "cappers,"
and as their agents. in obtaining employment for them; and
petitioners' knowing acceptance of employment through the
legal aid services of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
in directing the handling of injury claims by its members
against the railroads. Upon such findings the committee
recommended suspension from practice of the law for varying

j"
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pI-nods against petitioners-Hildebrand for four years. Bills
fur two years, and McLeod for one year.
Thereafter the record was submitted to the Board of Govt'rllors, which body. after full argument and consideration
or the matter. made its own findings affirming substantially
thp conspiracy and solicitation findings of the 'committee both
as to petitioners' procurement of professional employment
through the activities of individuals operating as u runners"
or "cappers" for petitioners. as well as through the contractual undertaking with the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. However, in passing upon the separate eharges of solicitation, the Board of Governors stated that such instances of
alleged misconduct "dissociated from {the J basie arrangement" with the Brotherhood and "standing alone" would fail
.. to make out a case of solicitation" in that "in practically
t'\'ery such case, standing alone, there was either a proper
rt'fereIice or a proper contact made by the attorneys within
the holdings of cases such as Hildebrand v. State Bar, 18 Cal.
2d 8]6 [117 P.2d 860]," and it "is only when these individual
cases are viewed in the light of their relationship to the
central arrangement and in the light of the evidence bearing
upon the charges of conspiracy . . . that they acquire significance. " With sqch limitation of the controlling factor in
this disciplinary proceeding against petitioners, and after
a detailed recital of the prevailing contraetual arrangement
between petitioners and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen whereby the latter "channeled;' the injury cases of its
members to petitioners for prosecution, the Board of Governors
concluded that petitioners were "guilty ... of violations of
Rule 2, section a, and Rule 3 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct" but reduced the degree of discipline to be imposed
upon petitioners according to the following recommendation
-that "Hildebrand be suspended from the practice of the
law ~ •. for a period of four months" and that "Bills and
• . . McLeod be publicly reproved by the Court."
It appears from a full examination of the record berein
that the Board of Governors properly narrowed the fundampntal issue of professional misconduct to petitioners' participation in the basic plan of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen in providing legal services for its members. Accordingly, the basic plan must be carefully analyzed with
respeet to its operation and effect in relation to the particular
Hules of Professional Conduct here involved.
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Rule 2, section a, reads: "A member of. The State Bar
not solicit professional employment by advertisement or
wise." (26 Cal.2d 32.) Rule 3, so far as here neli:inAl
provides: "A member of The State Bar shall not Amnt,,"'!Jj
another to solicit or obtain, or remunerate another for so]lcdit;.~
ing or obtaining, professional employment for him;
except with a person licensed to practice law, shall he dil'Mtlv:iJl
or indirectly share compensation arising out of or tnf~ld.~'n~~:~
to professional employment; nor . . . ~owingly accept'
fessional employment offered to him as a result of ora.
incident to the activities of any person .not so lieensed or
any association or corporation that for compensation CO]lm~1a.
directs or influences such employment ..• " (26 Cal.2d.
There is no conflict in the evidence concerning the
plan. It appears that in 1930 the Brotherhood of Railroad·~
Trainmen established a Legal Aid Department as a service ';1
to its members and their families in procuring lawyersu:".
perienced in personal injury law to prosecute damage ~1aim1
against the railroad companies, at eharges which would be;'
somewhat less than the usual percentage of contingent feea,"~:
in such cases. Regional counsel was designated ineaeli ..
territorial zone, and the employment of such counsel"';'
urged or -stronglYl'ecommended to tlleuiJur mem ers an.:,
their families. As part of this Legal Aid Department,there',
was also established an investigation service withinvestigatoii(~~
~igned to report on ~efa.cts of an accid.e~t case and obtahi.·.....~.;.
eVldence thereon pertment to the presentatIon of the ~:
claims.
, , ' .-'!
The plan originally called for a written contract on a 2Q"
per cent contingent fee basis, with the agreement on the pan.'. . . •]. •.i
of the attorney to turn over one-fourth of that amount, or.~.
5 per cent, to the Brotherhood for maintenance of the Legal;
Aid Department. Contracts were to be executed direct1yj',
between the designated regional counsel and the injured ~.'.
claimants on forms approved by the Legal Aid DepartmeIlt, ,;
and such counsel was required to advance all necessary court)
costs, expert witness fees, expense of medical examinations,
and like expenditure items. These expenses were to be deducted from the amount of recovery before a division woul~
be made of the net sum between the lawyers and the claimants. j
As here pertinent in the time period involved, Hildebrand, :
who had been acting alone as r<>gional counsel in this state
for the Brotherhood ~inc<> 19~1. was joined in the enterprise
by Bills sometime prior to l!I·HllUld by McLeod in 1942; and ,
J"
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together they undertook by contractual arrangement W1th
tbe Brotherhood to render legal services to its members in
pursuance of the basic plan. Meanwhile it appears that a
change was made in the contingent fee provisions 80 that
the claimant was required to sign two contracts covering an
aggregate contingent fee of 25 per cent-onecontract calling
for 19 per cent to the attorney for legal services and the
other for 6 per cent to the Brotherhood for the maintenance
/)r the Legal Aid Department, with its investigating service.
Then as of June 15, 1946, this fee procedure was superseded
under an arrangement with the Brotherhood permitting the
attorneys to handle the cases on a fiat 25 per cent basis but
requiring them to pay the investigators, members of the
Brotherhood's sta1f, on a quantum meruit basis for their
services.
[1] A realistic appraisal of this basic plan compels the
conclusion that it offended recognized standards of professional conduct in providing the means whereby solicitation
of the employment of petitioners was effected on a wholesale
basis in violation of rule 2, section a. While the members
of the Brotherhood were not· compelled to employ regional
-eounsel for the handling of their lawsuits, they were subject
to continuous an~ strong recommendation from the Brotherhood to do so through its journal publications and circulars
to the members, as well as by personal visits from officers
of the Brotherhood locals advising the injured railroad men
and their families to avail themselves of the benefits furnished
by the Legal Aid Department, embracing selected investi.
gating and legal services. The compensation to be received
by regional counsel for their representation of injured railroad men or their families was all predetermined according
to the basic plan with the Brotherhood, and the client's signing of the contracts calling for legal and investigating services
on the 19 per cent and 6 per cent contingent fee basis was
no more than a ratification of the Brotherhood's arrangement
with the designated regional counsel. There is no question
from the record but that petitioners knew exactly how their
professional employment by injured railroad men was being
solicited for them through the Brotherhood's activities, and
they were willing to perform the desired legal services at
a substantially reduced contingent fee rate in the belief
that the volume of business to be directed to thf'm through
such solicitation would warrant such financial consideration.

510
From such aspect it is apparent that the solicitation in
had its "origin in the mindls] of" petitioners
the common course of action arranged with the Hriotlilerllloci~jl
(see People v. Levy, 8 Cal.App.2d Supp. 763, 769 [50
509]), and as parties to such agreement, petitioners
be held accountable for the results of tbeir participationthe preconceived general scheme.
[2a] Rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.,
expressly proscribes the remuneration by an attorney
another for "soliciting or obtaining professional employment
for him," and likewise denounces an attorney's knowing
acceptance of employment as a result of the "activities of •• ~'
any association or corporation that for compensation controls,'
directs or influences such employment." It is clear from the
record that the Brotherhood has been remunerated and com·
pensated for soliciting, directing and influencing the em·
ployment of petitioners by its members. In the first place
for its participation in the common course of action, it appears
that the Brotherhood under the two-contract contingent fee
arrangement-the 6 per cent allowance for investigation and . •
the 19 per cent allowance for legal services, which was the"
procedure followed for a great deal of the time here
.-,
tinent-discharged a sizable deficit ($100,000) which had
accrued over the years in the beginning of the Legal. Aid .
Department's operations when the investigating services
furnished free to the members, and, in addition, built up.
reserve of "approximately $80,000.00." [3] But furthermore, it cannot be said that the reference to remuneration
and compensation in rule 3 envisages only the receipt of
money as distinguished from other advantages or benefits
that may accrue from an employment undertaking as is here
involved. Thus (1) it was a matter of concern to the Brother·
hood that the lawsuits of its injured members be handled by
experienced lawyers, and the basic plan with petitioners was
designed to provide legal services for its members at what
might be termed "wholesale rates"; and (2) such service
would reasonably constitute an inducing cause for attracting
membership in the Brotherhood and the payment of dues
thereto. In the light of these considerations, it appears in~
disputable that the ethical standards envisaged by rule 8,
supra, have been violated by petitioners.
[2b] Petitioners argue that the Brotherhood's Legal Aid
plan has been approved by judicial decision, citing Ryan v.
Pennsylvania R. Co. (Ill. 1932), 268 lll.App. 364. In that

1
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case a regional attorney for the Brotherhood sought to assert·
a lien for professional service, based upon a contingent fee
contract of 20 per cent executed with the injured railroad man,
where the railroad company had secretly settled with the
client. The railroad company contended that such retainer
embodied an illegal contract (1) not only in that the professional employment had been solicited by the Brotherhood
(2) but also in the fee-splitting feature inherent in the arrangement in that the· compensation for the attorney was in reality
only 14 per cent and the remaining 6 per cent was to go to the
Brotherhood as its share of the damage recovery. The contract
in question was upheld by the appellate court of Illinois for .
the purpose of the attorney's lien, and accordingly the attorney was awarded 20 per cent of the amount of the settlement.
It is true that in reaching such decision, the court .fully
detailed the "organized plan" in its operative e:lfect upon reo
gional counsel's undertaking personal injury cases for mClll:bers of the Brotherhood, but such examination of thc coordinated activity of the Brotherhood and regional counsel was
correlated with the processes of the Legal Aid Department .aR
a service feature to the Brotherhood's members in securin~
legal services at a minimum fee coincident with the competent .....
investigation of reported injury claims....Inso~ussing tht> ' "
facts from the standpoint of the benefits a:lforded the Brother:---'---'"'!·~r!:"".---/
'hood and its members in the assertion of their legal rights .
rather than from the standpoint of the proprieties of the law"
yer in maintaining professional standards, the· Illinois· court
concluded that it uwould not be justified in holding that the
contract on which the [attorney's] claim is based 'was secured
by unlawful and unethical solicitation and fee-splitting.'" .
(P.379.)
The distinct premise of the Ryan decision is precisely noted
in the case of In re O'Neill (Dist. Ct., E.D. N. Y., 1933), 5 F.
Supp. 465, a disciplinary proceeding for the alleged infraction
of the ethic8l standards of the New York State Bar Association relative to "stirring up litigation." There in passing
upon the Brotherhood's basic arrangement with regional
counsel for the handling of injury claims of Brotherhood
members, the court noted that "during the progress of [thE' I
proceeding" the original contingent fee arrangement between
"the [attorney], his client, and the Brotherhood" (callin~
for a single contract for a20 per cent fee with the attorney.
who' 'turned over one-quarter [thereof] to the Brotherhood")
'somewhat altered in form-as the result of an intimation

.as ·
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judicially imparted at preliminary bearing-so that now
[attorney] procures two contracts, one to secure hie 11
cent. contingent fee. and the other whereby the client'
ploys the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood"
the investigating work on. his claim, and "agree[s] •.
pay it. in accordance with its plan, 5 per cent. of the net _."'""",,:.l1li
ment, verdict or recovery." (P. 467.) With regard to
. oRteosiblt! change in the contractual relations of the D8.1~L""
tbe court pertinently continued at page 467: "We ean _, ....._
difference in principle between theose of two contracta
one, where the purpose is to secure for the BrotherhoOa
quarter of the contingent fee as a·contribution to the _t-.;1lIIi
Aid Department of which the investigator is a re]~reBeJllta1tm';·
Then after noting the further professional standard of
New York State Bar Association declaring that the "
monal services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
ploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which .lll.UI7r."=
venes between client and lawyer" and so destroys the 1.. +....'..
independence of function with the former, the court reieatAMI
the attorney's claim that .. thE' practice in question "miiht
be justified "because of what was written in the case of Rffv. The Pennsylvania Bat'lroad Co.," with this
(pp. 467-468): "The basis of rthat1 decision was that
-eGntract was not contrary to public policy, and that the
Brotherhood was engaged in rendering an enlightened seniee .
to its members . . . [but that] is not the question upon which.
this court has to pass, which has to do only with the infraction: .
of its rules. . . . tt is our conclusion that the [attorney 'Ii] .
unprofessional conduct as indicated has been clearly estab- .
lished, and invites the censure of the court, which is hereb)r .
recorded. "
.
Petitioners argue that the contingent fee arrangements here
made between the parties are not vulnerable to the prevailing
objection in the O'Neill case because the contract in favor of .'
the Brotherhood for 6· per cent of the net recovery was 1're&ented to the client not by the attorney but by a represent&- .
tive of the Brotherhood, so that the attorney concerned himself only with his own contract for the 19 per cent allowance.
In fact, petitioners admit that this new procedure in handling
the two contracts was adopted as the result of the discussion
and criticism expressed in the 0 'Neill case. But the censurable premise of the divided contingent fee contract remained
the same. There waR no rhanllt> in thE' RUbstance of fhe entire
transaction as emanating. from the Brotherhood '. Legal Aid

l
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Department for the coordinated purpose of supplying to the
members the services of investigators and legal counsel. Con.
tracts for the two services were made dependent.one upon the
other, for, aecording to the record, petitioners were unable to
cite any instance' where the injured' member ever executed a
contingent fee contract with the Brotherhood for the investigat,ion of his ease and yet did not at substantially the same time
execute a contingent fee contract for legal representation. In
flbort, the two contracts constituted but one overall transaction
involving the division of compensation between regional coun8e1 and the Brotherhood as a fee-splitting device contrary to
rule 3· of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the requirement that an attorney dissociate himself in his professional
employment from control by a lay intermediary or organization.
Petitioners claim that their conduct was approved by this
court in the ease of Hildebrand v. State Bar (1941),18 Cal.2d
816 [117 P.2d 860], where a "charge of solicitation of profl'ssional employment" made against petitioner Hildebrand,
urting as regional counsel in the representation of an injured
railroad man under the'auspices of the Brotherhood's Legal
Aid Department, was dismissed as not "sufficiently supported
h~' the evidence"-tht so-called"Bishop Matter." (pp. 830,.,
~:l4, ) A reading of that opinion, however, clearly. shows that
tli" disciplinary issue there resolved related only to alleged
lIliRconduct as correlated with the charge of solicitation of the
·,nl' case in question, and did not purport to pass 11pon the
!!('nE'ral charge of Usolicitation of professional employment"
pursuant to the basic plan of the Brotherhood in procuring its
memhers to employ designated regional counsel as part of the
services rendered by the Legal Aid Department. As so distinguished, the Hildebraud ease is not a judicial determination ,
of the precise disciplinary consideration here argued-the
propriety of petitioners' contractual relationship with the
Brotherhood as a part of the basic service plan of the Legal
Aid Department to its members, when attacked as a general
overall solicitation of legal employment contrary to established
nrofessional standards.
{4] There is no merit to petitioners' further claim that any
fep.splitting criticism to which the divided contingent fee eontraet might be subject is 110 longer a factor for consideration
here. since that arrangement was 8llperseded in .Tune. ]946.
by the mngle contractual stipulation of 25 per cent conlin-

a
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gent fee running wholly in favor of the attorney, who
therefrom the Brotherhood's investigators on a UUj:JftJUIlt
"uit basis. Obviously, in the determination of this dis,cip:liDI
proceeding petitioners must be held accountable for
ti('!'lI which existed during the period that they were CDI~IIIJ~
with misconduct. Moreover, under both situations as
:llTllngements the general "channeling" of legal work to
'H.np1'!l continued as a prevailing procedure embraced in.
IIrotherhood's undertaking with petitioners. Likewise--tm.m&.-'I
IPria1 is the fact that as of October 15, 1949. petitioner
Immd's appointment as "regional counsel for the BrIDthler~;l
hood of Railroad Trainmen" was canceled and tex'JDina'teil.,1
While there may no longer be a "basic contractual arr'8lUre-)\
ment" with the Brotherhood as a present disciplinary
lem it is petitioners' prior actions as heretofore discussed
must be examined in the light of the charge of pr()fel!SloUl
misconduct. Nor does the worthiness of the Legal Aid Department as an enterprise established by the Brotherhood to riD;']
der valuable services to its members in providing the meaDl:
for appropriate presentation of their damage claims (I,. ;.~'.
O'Nc,al, 81.tpra, 5 F.Supp. 465) or the manner in which the'
charge of misconduct on .t.he part of. petitioners w~ mad.e 1Q.".' :
-nle--StateJ3arobscure the essential issue of petitioners'~ .
leged violation of profesSional standards by reason of their.
participation in the basic plan of the Brotherhood as a generalJ

scheme
of professional employment amour
. . •.. ::;.·:..•..1•. ~
membersforofthe
theSOlicl.·tation
Brotherhood.
Petitioners' acts as here assailed in relation to rule 2, ,180'::
tion a, and rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 81.tpt'II,:
cannot be condoned as consistent with the ethical proprieties .•
exacted of members of the bar in this state. However, in view.i
of the somewhat divergent implications found in the cited 1
eases concerning the Brotherhood's basic plan, and in the
absence of any prior decision in this state holding that it was
improper for petitioners to participate in such a plan in thel
manner above described, it is our conclusion that the ends of '1.
justice will be served by dismisSing the present proceeding i
without disciplinary action, thereby permitting this opinion,!
as the first expression of the views of this court upon the :
subject, to serve prospectively as a guide to the members of ;
the profesSion generally, rather than to serve retrospectively
to the detriment of petitioners.
The proceeding is dismissed.
.i
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CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I concur in the judgment of dismissal, but dissent from
the holding of the majority that petitioners have violated
rule 2, section (a) and rule 3 of the Rules of Professional Confluet of The State Bar of California.
Before discussing the mode of operation of the Brotherhood
and petitioners with reference to the legal aid services here
iD\"olved, it is necessary to examine the background that led
to tlle arrangement between them. It appears that the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is an organization of railroad
l'Dlployees. Those employees agreed that it was advisable to
provide some means whereby they could more efficiently handle
rases of railroad workmen who were injured in the course of
their work. Such claims are certainly not "damage actions"
in an ordinary sense for they arise under the Federal Employers Liability Act of Congress (45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.).
That act was designed for the protection of railroad employees
engaged in interstate commerce who otherwise were left to
common law remedies which were wholly inadequate. This
act filled the need that workmen's compensation acts accorded
to other workingmen and is buttressed by the Safety Appliance
Act of Congress (45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.). These acts, however, lack tlie informality of procedure characteristic of the
workmen's compensation acts, .as the claims arising thereunder
are prosecuted in the courts rather than before a commission
and, hence, qualified counsel, .as well as competent inveStigators, are'indispensible. The Brotherhood here involved is
an organization composed of the persons who are protected by
the Federal Employers Liability Act. supra, and their employers are subject to its provisions. Hence there is a manifest community of· interest between the employees and their
organization, which justifies the latter in the procurement of
legal and investigation services. all of which directly ties in to
the rights and remedies established by the Federal Employers
Liability Act. Thus, we do not have a case where the purpose,
motive and result is the stirring up or exciting of litigation.
Nor do we have a situation where hirelings are used to obtain
clients for an attorney who would otherwise have no contact
with them. Much less is there any splitting of fees or knowingly obtaining clients for a compensation. It is nothing more
than a proper joining of forces for the accomplishment of a
proper legal objective of mutual protection.
The arrangement between petitioners and the Brotherhood
at the time pertinent as outlined by the majority opinion is
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that the Brotherhood and petitioners agreed that: the lat1_~1II
were to be counsel for a certain geographical m;ea and
available to handle cases for employee claimants-members
the Brotherhood who suffered industrial injuries in that
For that service, the contract with the claimant was
agreeing to pay 6 per cent of any recovery to the J:S1'OTJIle1'ltlOOlll
for its investigation services, and the other to pay, 19 per
to petitioners as their fee for handling the prospective
to recover on the claim. The Brotherhood urged its members
to take advantage of the service, although they _ere not
quired to do so, and petitioners knew that the niembers '
so urged.
,,"
If such a plan subjects the attorney with whom the arrange.. ,,
ment is made to disciplinary action for solicitation, as, thlD.
majority holds, then a rule has been established that will have'
morp rar reaching effects than any ever before stated by this
court. The ramifications are innumerable. The rule ,will'
apply to other professional fields where a similar arrangemettt
must be held to constitute solicitation and, therefore, forbidden. Merely scratching the surface uncovers the universal
provision of liability insurance policies under which t11e, in~;
, _,___.!.':!!!r agrees t~~~_~<!_.!he 5l!~!,~~_~n~8!ly'legal ac.tio.n,
under such a policy and retains control over' th_t Htii..... tinn
including the employment of an attorney. The tees of
ilttorneyare -paid 'by tlietnsurer' our ~oflhe premiums ~,'"~r.-'l
-ceives from the insured. Tht insurer advertises for and .
solicits business-the sale of its policies. It would be folly to
suggest that the attorneys employed by such insu\-ers do not
the practice. and it is common knowledge
know that such
that some attorneys. whilt not on a salary-employee'basis with
the insurer. have an arrangement whereby they are regularly
retained to defend tht insurer's insured. The situation ill
not distingUishable from the instant ease except possibly it
may be said that this is a stronger case from the standpoint
of professional ethics. Is this court going to discipline
attorneys who art employed by insurance companies torepre~
sent their insured'
Reference may also be had to legal aid bureaus for indigent
persons. Such bureaus. urgE' the
of the services offered.
and the attorney rendtrinl!' tht flervice knows of such solieitation, yet no ont q1itstions the practice. True, the attorney
may give his time without eharge, but practicing law free is
nevertheless practicing law.
It is a matter of common knowledge that such state-wide i
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organizations as contractors' associations, merchants'. associa·
tions, cattlemen's associations, etc., employ attorneys to represent such organizations and furnish advice to individual
members of such organizations on matters of general and common interest, and that under the arrangement between these
organizations and the attorneys employed by them, such attoru!'ys handle cases for individual members of such organizations who may be referred to such attorneys by representatives of such organizations on a fee arrangement agreed upon
between such organization and the attorneys so employed, and
if the problem involved in any such case is of general or common interest to the members of the organization, the latter
will pay a portion if not all of the fee and expenses incident
to the handling of such a case. It is obvious that under such
an arrangement the representative of such organization solicits
the member to take his case to the attorney for the organization, and the representative of the organization is paid out
of funds derived from the contributions of members thereof.
This is a common practice and I have never heard of its being
attacked as unethical or a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct of The State Bar of California. Under the rule
announced in the majority opinion, any attorney employed by
such an organization who accepts employment from a member
of .such organization, who was referred to such attorney by
the paid representative of such organization. would be guilty
of unprofessional conduct and subject to discipline for a violation of the rule of professional conduct here involved.
In the medical practice field we have such organizations as
the Ross-Loos plan (25 Cal.L.Rev. 95) where doctors have
joined in a plan to give medical care for persons at a fixed
amount. Patient members of such a plan are probably solicited. There are countless other such arrangements. (See
California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, 28 Ca1.2d 790
[172 P.2d 4,167 A.L.R. 306J.) Colleges and universities commonly supply medical care for their students and a fee is
charged therefor. The attendance of such students may have
been solicited.
The application of the rule announced in the majority
opinion will destroy all of the foregoing plans and systems,
as well as many others. I cannot believe that the rules of
ethical conduct have any such purpose or design. The essential object of the instant plan is not to obtain clients for an
attorney. It. is to enable the organization (the Brotherhood)
to assist its members in a matter of vital concern to them.
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It does not urge its members to avail themselves of the iervices in order to bring business to the counsel, or to "stir up"
litigation. It is a method by which an attorney may be
employed at a lesser fee, one whose special qualifications are
previously determined. Certainly the attorney is not soliciting business any more than would an attorney who agreed to
represent a whole group of persons. The Brotherhood is not
soliciting for him. It does not care whether he gets business
and profits thereby. It IS primarily concerned with assisting
its members or, phrased otherwise, it is nothing more than
a group of persons who are interested in protecting themselvesin the event of injury. It is merely incidentalthat in so doing
a benefit results to the attorney.
The entire field must be examined in this matter rather
than summarily brushing aside many organizations and arrangements which are serving a definite social need. The
needs and policy underlying the plan of the Brotherhood are
very pertinent. The majority opinion states: "Nor ,does the
wOTthiness of the Legal Aid Department as an enterprise established by the Brotherhood to render valuable services to its '
members in providing the means for appropriate presentation
of their damage claims . . . obscure the essential issue of
petitioners' alleged violation of professional standards by
reason of their participation in the basic plan of the Brotherhood ao; a genera] scheme for thE' solicitation of professional.
employment among members of the Brotherhood." I cannot
agree with the foregoing declaration, as it must be remembered
that here the court is not applying a legislative enactment'
over wht·ch it has no control and with the wisdom of which it
cannot be concerned. On the contrary, it is supreme in the
field of attorney-disciplinary matters. (Brydonjack v. State
Bar, 208 Cal. 439 [281 P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507] ; 9 Ca1.Jur.
10-Yr.Supp., Practice of Law, §§ 4,40-42.) It is not merely
mf!chanically interpreting and applying a rule of ethics over I
which it cannot concern itself. Indeed, it is its duty to examine into the wisdom of the rule, and observe its effect under
various circumstances. Particularly it is bound to consider
the scope of its application and all the questions of policy
necessarily involved in such process. Certainly this court
should not blind itself to the situation existing with respect
to the plight of the injured railroad workmen who may be
ignorant of their rights and f1\l1 ,·iC'tlms to lay claims agents
of railroad eompanif'R who are bound by no rules of ethics
or professional conduct.
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In endeavoring to meet the contt'J1tioll tbllt ,. violation of
the rule requires that the solicitor (the Brotht'rhond) receive
compensation for its solicitation. the majority Rtates: .. (1) it
was a matter of concern to the Brotherhood thaI thf' IIIWl'Illits
of its injured members be handled by expf'rien{~t>d law~·.·~. and
the basic plan with petitioners wa!~ rlf'si/!llpd to proVll1t' lpl!'al
.scM'ices for its members at wbat mil!'bt bp tt>rmf'd 'wholf'sale
rates' j and (2) such service would reasonably (>onl'l1ill1tf' an
indu('ing cause for attracting membf'l'Rhip in fbI:' Brothprhood
and the payment of dues thereto." An ohviollS anRWer to that
argument is that those benefits were not rf>ef>ivf>f1b~' the
Brotherhood for obtaining clients for pe.titioner.~ Tbt>y were
received as the incidt>nt of the plan to provide competent legal
services for its members.
The authorities support the proposition that tht> arrangement here considered violates no mIt> of profMl!o;ional f'tbies.
In Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. Co .. 268 Ill.App 864. the same
plan was involved. Contrary to the majority opinion. the
basis of that case wa.' flot that the contract for affnrflP-Y8' fee.
was flot against public policy. Thf' ('on tract was held valid
because there was no breach of ethics by the otforfley. The.
court, after outlining the BrothprhClod'f\ plan. statt>d: "Respondent contends that" 't~e apppl1(>Ei"iRnot'flltitled10 -an
attorney's lien bectl1tse the contract on which his claim is ba.lled

I'
ij

was secured by "nlaw/ttl and 'U7IethieaZ!!n1;df(lfin1l (lnd fee,plitting,' that 'the proof showed that thE'l'P was a wen organ-

b:ed plan or scheme by which apppBf'f' Attorney JosE'ph D.
Ryan obtained many personal injury ('al'OPS through the solicitation of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trsinmpn Rnd its investiJmtors,' and that 'it is clear that RpppllE'E' Ryan obtained
the Meadows case through the unlawful anel unE'thical solicitation by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and its
investigators'; that it 'can see no dift'erf'n(>t> fl'om tht> Mandpoint of legality and ethies between anindivielnal ambulance
chaser soliciting personal in';ury claims. and a corporation Rnd
its investigators investigating the ca8t>R of proposed claimants
and influencing said claimants to rt>tain their Rf>l!'iona] Counsel.' After a careful consideration of all the faets we are
satisfied that these eOfitefltionll and Rl'smmt>nts are withont
merit, and we feel impellf'd to Sfly that
(llI!Iertion that the

,f!!

,h,.

Brotherhood. through
legal lIid department. '$I okin tn an
ambulance chaser tlnd that the petitioner "'(111 0 benefi,citJry
of a71 uflethieal and tlfl.la'IJIfll·l !!'lstP.m nf n'hfni"i"" clients. is
unworthy of 'ke able lawye~B who made it. The Brotherhood

;
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is a lahor organization, composed of men engaged in h8.l!lllr,dotl.
occupations and who are banded together for mutual protection and advancement. The evidence establishes that it or- .
ganized the legal aid department for the sole purpose of pro- .'
teeting its injured members or their families in the matter of ,,'
claims growing out of injuries sustained in the course of"
employment. Tbe argument that the legal aid department
was a solicitation scheme by which petitioner 'obtained many.
personal injury cases' is a most unfair one and entirely unwarranted under the evidence. The evidence, introduced b.Y.'
respondent, shows clearly the worthy purpose of the depart- .
ment and the necessity for its organization and maintenance.
The instant case is an illustration of its benefit to the members
, . . Such an arrangement was not unethical." [Emphasis
added.]
In re O'Neill, (Dist. Ct. E.D.N.Y., 1933) 6 F.Supp. 465,
misinterprets the Ryan case, and fails to give consideration to
the true nature of the plan.
Finally, there is no splitting of fees under the plan. The
contract for the 6 per cent for investigation fee runs to the
Brotherhood. The attorney bas nothing to do with it. To
assume that it is part of his fee is contrary tQ the facts. .The
situation is no different than if each member would execute
a contract with the Brotherhood that in the event he used the
services of the Brotherhood at any time in the future he would .
pay therefor 6 per cent of his recovery. In either case the .
relation between that charge and the attorney's fees for his
services is wholly independent.
In holding that the Brotherhood cannot arrange with an
attorney to represent its members who may suffer industrial
injuries when such members are referred to such attorney by a
paid representative of the Brotherhood, the majority of this
court have struck a lethal blow at one of the most vital functions of the Brotherhood as a labor organization. It was
largely through the effort of the Brotherhood that the Federal
Employers Liability Act was enacted by Congress. This act
has been amended many times at the suggestion of the Brotherhood in order to accomplish its ultimate objective of extending
the greatest possible measure of protection to railroad workmen engaged in interstate commerce. It is obvious that this
objective will be defeated unless the Brotherhood may now see
that those members entitled to the protection afforded by the
al't are inforIDf'd as to what to do to gain such protection.
The first step in this direction is the selection of a competent
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attorney and the ascertainment of the facts which constitute
the basis of the claim which the injured workman must assert
in order to establish liability for his injuries. The Brotherhood, through its legal aid department, has sought to provide
the essential means necessary to secure to its members the
protection afforded by the act. In so doing, it has done no
more than many other, organizations which have employed
counsel to protect the interests of their members. In my opinion, such arrangements should not be condemned as unethical.
The organization has an interest in the social and economic welfare of its members. It cannot be denied that the social and
economic welfare of every railroad workman and his dependents is imperiled when he suffers injury or death in the course
of his employment. Any concept of ethics which would deny
to such an organization the right to suggest to such injured
workman, or his dependents in case of his death, that he or
they consult an attorney, is not worthy to be known by that
name, and the mere fact that the organization has arranged
with such attorney to handle cases for its members on a re-;
duced fee basis should not render such arran~ement unethical. '
The foregoing considerations should dispose of this proceeding
as a misguided venture in the field of legal ethics. Petitioners
h.ave d?neno wrong in enteriIfg ~to the arran~ement in questIon WIth 'the Brotherhood, and m the handlmg of cases referred to them by representatives of the Brotherhood pursuant to such arrangement.
The proceeding against petitioners should therefore be dismissed.
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1929 the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen undertook an investigation of the settlements and recoveries its members were receiving under the Federal Employers
Liability Act for injuries incurred in the course of their employment. This investigation disclosed that the workers were
not receiving the full benefits to which they were entitled
because of their unfamiliarity with their rights and tneir
frequent premature release of claims at the persuasion of railroad claims adjusters, together with incompetent and overpriced legal assistance. It appeared that the situation would
become worse because of a nation-wide drive to suppress ambulance chasing attorneys, who, incompetent or overreaching
as they might be, frequently provided the only effective,check
lIpon the activiti€'s of the claim!': adjusters. Accordingly, to
protect its members both from precipitous settlement of claims
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and amblllAnlle chllsjn~ attorneys, the Brotherhood in 1930'
established its Legal Aid Department to acqnaint memberi
with their ri:rhts. and to investigate accidents to unearth
necessary evidence. It was essential to these purposes to havf"
i competent attorneYR available at reasonable fees. The Brother:','
i bood therefore secured the agreement of such attorneys:"
tbrougbout the country to aceept the cases of injllred memben., i
at a rt>asonable contingent fee, with the understanding th8t thee
Brotherhood would recommend the attorneys to its injured i
memhers who would be free to retain them or not. Thus: ,a' ,:i
,:!roup with a legitimate need for competent legal assistance-.J
in a specialized class of cases common to it, solicited the assistance of qualified attorneys at reasonable fees. It is conceded that members of the Brotherhood have thereby been
able to secure adequate legal assistance in presenting their
cases under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The issue
if': whether the attorneys may participate in the Brotherhood's
plan without violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Given the primary duty of. the legal profession to se""~ the
public. the rules it establishes to p:overn itR professional ethics
mnst be directed at the performance of that duty. Canons of
ethics that would operate to deny to the railroad employees .~
__ t~~_~fl'~~p_!~!eK~L~ssist{l.ncethey need ,can be justified DnlY~
if such a denial is necessary to suppress professional condu.ct
that in other cases would be injuriolls to tlte effective disch~!,ge.····
of the profession's duties to the public.
It is contended that the Brotherhood's IIttorneys are violating rule 2 prohibiting the solicitation of professional employment and rule 3 prohibitiYlg acceptance of employment channeled to the attorney by an organization "that for compensation controls. rlirects or influences such employment... ;"
It is neceRRary to consider against what evils these rules are
directed and whether the operation of a plan such as that
inaugurated by the Brotherhood involves the danger of such
evils.
These rules raise the familiar problems of advertising and
ambulance chasing. Advertising has generally been discoun~
ten anced by the profession (American Bar Association Canon
of Professional Ethics No. 27) as undignified and misleading.
Advertising is hardly a measure of competence, given the
profession's long standing disapproval of it. Clients who
need legal assistance only rarely and are therefore inexperi-I
enced in selecting counsel. may be induced by advertisin,:r
select unsuitable counsel, with consequent injury not only to,
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themselves but.to the reputation of the bar as a whole. (See
Llewellyn, The Bars ' Troubles and Poultices-and Cures I,
S Law and Contemporary Problems 104, 116.)
Direct solicitation by ambulance chasing has led to serious
abuses. "The testimony demonstrates very clearly the evils
of the system of ambulance chasing. Competition between
'ambulanee chasers,' and between 'ambulance chasers' and
attorneys, in procuring cases, visits to homes and hospitals to
pro('ure retainers at unseemly hours. and when the injured
pt'rson or the members of his family were in no mental condition to ('nter ~nto contracts for the engagement of lawyers'
st'rvices, division of fees with solicitors and procurers, payment of moneys to officials, doctors, and others for help in
procuring cases, the use of photographs of checks of amounts
of recov('ries had, and newspaper clippings showing successes
in court. for the purpose of procuring clients, are all laid
bare." (Matter of Gondelman, 225 App.Div. 462 [233 N.Y.S.
343.346].)
While rule 2 is directed against the solicitation of professional employment by an attorney, rule 3 is concerned with the
lay intermediary between attorney and elient who seeks to
profit from the solicitation, control, or infiuence of professional
employment. .A ~rofit-motivated lay agency may exert various harmfuJi1ifiuences on the profession. It may be more
interested in th(' Jlrofittobe derived from legal business than
in the best interests of the clients. Thus lay ambulanee
chasers who solicit cases and thenselJ them to attorneys are
apt to seek out, not the most competent attorney, but the one
who will pay the most for a case. It may be more profitable·
for professional ambulance chasers to operate ona high-volume low·return basis than to consider the best interests of
each client. (See Nationwide War on " Ambulance Chasers,"
14 Amer. Bar Ass'n Journal 561, 563.)
Again, a lay agency may ~ect its clients to attorneys who
will in turn·recommend the services of the agency, even though
the client may not need them. Thus a trust company in recommending attorneys to draft wills may favor those who
recommend trust provisions. (See Cohen, Fiduciaries and
Lawyers. 7 Ind.L.Jour. 295, 306-308, reprinted in Costigan,
Cases on the Legal Profession [2d ed.] 364-366.) It may not
be in the client's interest to incorporate trnst provisions in
his will. but if the attorney is receiving the business throng!)
th,. rpC'ommf'ndation of a tT1U!t C'ompany. hI" may bp inflnt>nced
by that fact. A rule prohibitlllg the acceptunce of basiuess
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channeled to him by a party whose interest in his services may
be adverse to those of the clients is justified to insure that the
clients' interests are kept paramount.
The lay intermediary may also interfere with the direct
attorney-client relationship. Thus, if an association retains
an attorney to advise on problems presented by the members,
and those problems are communicated to the attorney through
the association, he may be constrained to give advice in the
light, not of all the facts, but of only the information thought
relevant by the member who requested advice of the association. (See American Bar Association, Opinions of the Com--~
mittee on Professional Ethics and Grievances [1947] No. 98,
p.212.)
There are situations, however, when an attorney's associa. i
tion with a lay organization fulfills a legitimate interest of i
the organization or its members, and presents no risk of eon·
flicting interests or other abuses. Such arrangements may be
tolerated even when the lay agency is actively engaged in'
soliciting business. Liability insurance companies provide
in their policies that they will arrange for the defense of any
action brought against the policy holder and demand that they
shall have the right to do so. By advertising their policies
they solicit the legal business that arises from their po .
holders' activities. At the same time they arrange with quali·
fied experts in personal.injury litigation to represent them
and their policy holderS in any litigation that arises. These
attorneys agree to this representation, knowing that their
professional employment will arise from the active solicitation
of business by the insurance companies. Such conduct on the
part of the attorneys is expressly permitted by rule 3, for
it is accepted as serving the public good. Liability insurance
is socially desirable; policy holders and the companies are
entitled to adequate legal representation; the sensible way to
provide such representation is through reguJarly.retained
experts. There is no risk that clients will be led to incompe:tent attorneys, and the attorneys are in a position to deal
directly with the client when the need for legal services arises.
Moreover, the interests of the insurance company and the
client will ordinarily coincide, so that there is little danger
that the insurance company's attorney will be placed in_~~_
position of representing conflicting interests. It has been-;
thought better to make adjustments for the occasional ease :
where the interests of the policy holder and the company con.-;
flict (see O'M..orr()1lJ v. Borad, 27 Cal.2d 794, 798-799 (167 P.2dJ
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483,163 A.L.R. 894]), than to prohibit the practice altogether.
The Brotherhood's attorneys bear much the same relation
to it as the insurance defense attorneys do to the insurance
companies. In neither situation do the attorneys themselves
solicit professional employment or pay the organizations involved for securing it, even though they reap the benefits of
the activities of the respective organizations that bring professional employment to them. Rule 3 recognizes that it is
the financial interest of the insurance company that Tenders
the employment of the company's expert attorneys for its
policy holders "necessary and proper for the protection of
such financial interest. " It illustrates a situation where considerations of policy make clear that there are no ethical objections to the channeling of professional employment to experts. Rule 3 and the policy underlying it do uot close the
door to similar practices in other situations where policy
considerations are as strong or stronger in favor of the propriety of group action. Rule 3 requires a financial interest
in the outcome of litigation to justify referrals only when the
association controls, directs, or influences such referrals for
compensation. It is thus designed to preclude attorneys from
dcceptingeJ!lployment from organizations engaged in the
business of providiiiiTegaI alivice'for 'proii-elt -aoesnot prO'hibit the acceptance of employment where the referring assodation makes the referrals; notfor'compensation, but solely
fa help its members secure legal assistance.
.
Bar association committees on professional ethics have l'eCognized that the protection of various social or group interests
justifies attorney participation in plans designed to protect
the legitimate interests of the group, even though the attorney
is retained by a group that recommends his services to its
members or otbers on problems they have in common. Thus
it bas been considered proper for the National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League publicly to offer to
defend the constitutional rights of those threatened by New
Deal legislation. "These issues transcend the range of professional ethics." (American Bar Association, Opinion!! of
th" Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances (1947)
No. 148. pp. 307, 311.) Similarly, the same organization has
approved the use of expert counsel by trade organization~ to
Il!!sist their members in conducting their bllSines.~es within the
framework of increasing governmental regulation. (Opinion
No 168. p. 340: see, ahlO. Oninion No 27~. P 569: Questions
and Answers of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the
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New York County Lawyers Association, Q~estion 47, reprinted~'
in Costigan, Cases on the Legal Profession [2d ed.) 866;
Relation of Lawyers and Lawful Trade Organizations mid~·
other Organizations, Opinion of the Committee on Professional :;:,
Ethics of the New York County Lawyers Association, reprinted"
in Costigan, I1tpra, 360.) These opinions have recognized that.·
in those cases where the members of lay associations have .
problems in common, it is proper for their associations -toarrange for competent legal assistance, even though to carry.
out the plans the associations must make known to their"
members the identity of competent counsel. Thus a bankers'
association may recommend its expert counsel to its members
.when they are faced with legal problemspeeuliar to the banking business, or a medical association may adopt a similar i
procedure for the benefit of its members.
It does not follow that an attorney may participate in •
plan by which the association itself engages in the practice
of law .. ,,' [Als the term is generally understood, the practice
of law is the doing and performing (of] services in a court
of justice in any matter depending therein throughout its
various stages and in conformity with the adopted rules of,
procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and~.
eounsel and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts .
by which legal rights are secured although such matterm&1,
or may not be depending in court.'" (People Y. Mercktm',
Proteditl8 Corp., 189 Cal 531, 535 [209 P. 363].) Corporations
and associations of unlicensed persons are denied the right to
practice law:
"The essential element underlying the relation of attorney
and client is that of trust and confidence of the highest degree
growing out of the employment and entering 'into the performance of every duty which the attorney owes to his elient in
the course of such employment. It is the existence of this
essential element as the basis of said relation which has ,called
into being the various statutory regulations governing the
admission of attorneys and counselors at law and which embody certain requirements of character, integrity and learning
as the prerequisites of such admission to the right and privi.
lege of practicing law. It is the possession or reputation for
the possession of these personal qualifications which constitutes. as a rule, the main inducement for the formation of the
personal and confidential relation of attorney and client. The
intf'Tvention of R corporation hf'hvPf'n the membership it secW'es and the attorneys it employs, which corporation can in
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and of itself possess none of these qualifications, obviously
leaves out of view the necessity for their existence. The essential relation of trust and confidence. between attorney and
client cannot be said to arise where the attorney is employed,
not by the client, but by some corporatjon which has undertaken to furnish its members with legal advice, counsel and
professional services. The attorney in such a case owes his
first allegiance to his immediate employer, the corporation,
and owes, at most, but an incidental, secondary and divided
loyalty to the clientele of the corporation." (PeopZe v. Mer·
chants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 539 [209 P. 363] ; see,
also, In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479 [92 N.E. 15,
139 Am.St.Rep. 839, 19 Ann.Cas. 879, 32 L.R.A.N.S. 55];
Bulleit, The Automobile Clubs and the Courts, 5 Law and
Contemporary Problems 22. )
In the present case, however, it is not contended that the
Brotherhood is engaged in the practice of law, and there is
no evidence of evils that the Rules of Professional Conduct are
intended to guard against. The Brotherhood's plan in no way
lowers the dignity of the profession. It does not lead the
railroad employees to incompetent counsel. There is no conflict in the interests of the Brotherhood and its members, and
therefore no danger that the attorneysreeommended by the
Brotherhood will be faced with conflicting allegiances. There
is no interference with the direct attorney-client relationship;
the members are free to retain or reject the attorneys recommended by the Brotherhood and they deal directly with the
attorneys themselves.
Since there is no issue of misconduct other than participaiion
in the basic plan of the Brotherhood, I concur in the judgment
dismissing the proceeding.
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